Parents' Rights Are Fundamental
A Review of Troxel v. Granville
On June 5, 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion on parental liberty. The decision was Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
In this case, Jennifer and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court
for the right to visit their grandchildren against the wishes of the parents. They
used as their authority a section of the Revised Code of Washington which
provided that "any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any
time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order
visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interests of
the child, whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) .
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the parents, determining that the
Washington statute unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of
parents to rear their children." This decision affirmed the Washington Supreme
Court. The Court ruled that "no court has found that Granville was an unfit parent.
That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act
in the best interest of their children." The Court went on to cite their earlier
decision of Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 at 602 (1979). The Court explained that
this presumption that parents are fit parents means that "so long as the parent
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason
for the state to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question
the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that
parent's children."
The error in the Superior Court's decision to grant the petition of visitation to
the grandparents was that the court placed on the fit custodial parent the burden of
"disproving that visitation would be in the best interests of her daughters." The U.S.
Supreme Court held that on the contrary, the grandparent must rebut the presumption
that the parent's decision to refuse the grandparent visitation was reasonable and
within his or her ability as a fit parent to make the best decisions concerning his children.
The U.S. Supreme Court cited a long history of their decisions upholding parental
rights as fundamental.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." We have long recognized that the Amendment's
Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection
gainst government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests
521 U.S. at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1,
113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
The liberty interest at issue in this case--the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children--is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401,
67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923), we held that the "liberty" protected by the
Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children"
and "to control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925), we again held that the "liberty
of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."
We explained in Pierce that "the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations. " 268 U.S. at 535. We returned to the subject
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944), and again
confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." 321 U.S. at 166.
In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972) ("It is plain that
the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children 'comes to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' " (citation omitted));
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) ("The
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255,
54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that
the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Parham v. J. R.,
442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically
has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course");
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (discussing
"the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child"); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in
addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right ... to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children" (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent,
it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children.
The U.S. Supreme Court finally held, "Considered together with the Superior Court's
reasons for awarding visitation to the Troxels, the combination of these factors demonstrate
that the visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville's
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her
two daughters."
Justice Thomas, in his concurring judgment, indicated that the plurality appropriately
recognized a parental liberty. He explained further that strict scrutiny needed to be applied
to infringements of these types of fundamental rights.
Parents battling oppressive state regulations and invasions of their families have a
clear decision that upholds their parental rights. In essence, this decision means that the
government may now not infringe parents' right to direct the education and upbringing of
their children unless it can show that it is using the least restrictive means to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.